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RECENT CASE NOTES
pendently of all other causes, from bodily injuries sustained through ex-
ternal, violent, and accidental means." Plaintiff recovered below and de-
fendant now claims the verdict is not sustained by sufficient evidence, in
that it was not shown that death was effected directly and independently
of all other causes. Decedent left his work, feeling ill, and started home
in his car. A witness testified that he heard a crash and found decedent
in his car, bent over the steering wheel, the car having run into a tree with
great force. The coroner said that death was due directly to shock, with
certain diseases as contributing factors, but that death would probably
have occurred by the shock alone. The jury found that the accident was
the only efficient and active cause of death. HELD: judgment affirmed,
The jury was given proper instructions and there was evidence to support
the verdict. Kokomo Life and Accident Insurance Co. v. Wolford, Appel-
late Court of Indiana, July 6, 1929; 167 N. E. 156.
There was evidence to support the verdict, and although there was evi-
dence to the contrary, in such case an appellate court can look only to the
evidence to sustain the verdict; and if, on all the evidence, reasonable men
might draw different inferences therefrom, one supporting the verdict and
the other impeaching it, the court must make the inference supporting the
verdict. Board of Commissioners of Parke County v. Sappenfield, 10 Ind.
App. 609; Bischof v. Mickels, 147 Ind. 115.
The causes of death referred to in the insurance policy were proximate
and direct causes and not remote causes. Continental Insurance Co. v.
Lloyd, 73 N. E. 824; Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Fitzgerald, 75 N. E. 262;
Robinson v. National Life and Accident Insurance Co., 76 Ind. App. 161.
The instruction asked for by defendant that "if insured suffered from
diseases and his death resulted from shock caused by external, violent and
accidental means jointly and in connection with such diseases, and if in-
sured's bodily infirmities were aggravated by the accident and his infirmi-
ties contributed to his death, there could be no recovery," was properly
denied. Continental Insurance Co. v. Lloyd, supra; Central Life Insurance
Co. v. Fitzgerald, supra; Robinson v. National Life and Accident Insur-
ance Co., supra.
If the accident set in motion a force that progressed upon existing con-
ditions, in natural and usual sequence, to effect the fatal result, the acci-
dent can be found to he the proximate cause of death. Continental Insur-
ance Co. v. Lloyd, supra.
In direct accord with this case, it has been held that where the policy
provided the same as in this case, and insured fell and broke his leg and
seven weeks later contracted pneumonia and died, that the disease was the
natural sequence of insured's weakened condition resulting from the fall,
and that the fall was therefore the proximate cause of death. Robinson V.
National Life & Accident Insurance Co., supra.
The case is undoubtedly sound. R. C. H.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-EVIDENCE--CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-DELEGA-
TION OF PowEs-Under the city manager law, Acts 1921, p. 594, c. 218,
No. 3, the city clerk was required to determine within five days after its
filing whether a petition, asking that the question of adoption of city man-
ager government be submitted to the electorate of a city, was signed by at
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least twenty per cent of the voters of the city at the last preceding munici-
pal general election. Such a petition was filed in Indianapolis; passed
upon; the election held, and voted that city commissioners be elected. This
suit is to enjoin the defendant's, the board of election commissioners, from
taking any steps to expend funds of the city, etc., for holding such an
election for city commissioners. Injunction denied. On appeal, HELD:
judgment reversed; injunction granted, on the ground that the statute in
question is unconstitutional. (Gemmill, C. J., and Martin, J., dissenting.)
Keene v. Remy, Supreme Court of Indiana, September 25, 1929; 168 N.
E. 10.
The court held that the determination of the sufficiency of the petition
is a judicial function; that such function may not be delegated; that the
court would take judicial notice that the work required of the city clerk
personally in examining the petition is a mental and physical impossibility,
since under the statute 19,000 signers to the petition were required; and
that section 3 "is unworkable, impossible of performance and
therefore invalid."
As to this a priori demonstration of impossibility, it has been suggested
that the clerk might have made the determination required by checking the
poll books. It was nowhere averred that he did not perform his task.
But the real issue between the majority and minority is on the question
whether the determination of the sufficiency of the petition is a judicial
function or an administrative act.
Assuming the function is judicial, the court has support in saying it
may not be delegated. Waldo v. Wallace, (1859) 12 Ind. 569. But is the
act of the clerk in determining whether or not a certain person is a quali-
fied elector a judicial function? The majority says it is "because there
must be a finding concerning the qualifications of the petitioner under the
constitution on which is based the judgment whether his name shall be
counted or not"; that the act cannot be ministerial, for "ministerial acts
do not empower a public officer to adjudge upon the matter before him."
No case is cited as in concurrence with this reasoning.
It must be frankly conceded to the majority that under a "drily logical"
interpretation of judicial power, it is arguable that the function in ques-
tion is a judicial one. Yet the courts have, by a sound concession to ex-
pediency and the needs of modern conditions, set apart a multitude of
functions and characterized them as ministerial or quasi-judicial. Such
latter functions may be conferred upon certain officers and commissions,
acting with such assistants as they deem necessary. The analogous cases
to the instant one seem to indicate that the function here is only the same
as that exercised by administrative or quasi-judicial officers similarly situ-
ated, i. e., to administer a standard, or "rule of conduct" (in this case the
constitutional standard of a qualified voter). The minority stated that
the clerk "acted as a ministerial, administrative officer, with power to ex-
amine the petitions . . . and determine their sufficiency," citing State
v. Roach, (1910) 230 Mo. 408; 130 S. W. 680, wherein it was held that
the Secretary of State, in examining the petition for referendum to see
that it is sufficient under the constitution and laws, performs the function
of a ministerial officer with the usual discretion lodged in such officer.
In view of other decisions of the Indiana courts it is difficult to follow
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the implication of the majority that every act of an officer requiring the
exercise of judgment upon the matter before him is a judicial function;
and that a ministerial or administrative act is one wherein judgment or
discretion is not exercised. Wilkins v. State, 113 Ind. 514, 16 N. E. 192,
held that under an act requiring a board of examiners to determine whether
or not an applicant to practice dentistry meets the statutory requirements,
while it means that the board in some degree acts judicially, the board
performs no judicial duty within the meaning of the constitution. "An
act is none the less ministerial because the person performing it will have
to satisfy himself that the state of facts exists under which it is his right
and duty to perform the act." Flourney v. Jeffersonville, 17 Ind. 169. The
discretion of a county superintendent to grant or withhold a teacher's
license to an applicant is not an exercise of a judicial function. Elmore
v. Overton, 104 Ind. 548. It is submitted that the superintendent in such
case "adjudges" whether or not the statutory qualifications are met, just
as surely as would the clerk in the instant case. And yet this and similar
exercises of discretion are held purely ministerial acts. The exercise of
such powers as the last preceding, and the powers of the railroad com-
missions, tax commissions, public service commissions, have been distin-
guished from judicial powers in that in the latter is involved the power to
determine finally the rights as between adverse parties, by a finding which
will be res judirata unless appealed from. Bergman v. Kearney, (1917)
241 Fed. 884. A further illustration of how far the courts have gone in
recognizing this distinct class of ministerial functions, is the power given
the Secretary of Labor to deport aliens if after a hearing he finds them
to be "undesirable residents of the United States." Mahler v. Eby, 264
U. S. 32, (1924).
As a ministerial function the clerk would properly determine the suffi-
ciency of the petition by employing assistants to help him. State v. Dunn.,
(1925) 118 Kan. 184, 235 Pac. 132. Such would not be a delegation of his
duty under the statute. The clerk would still be the one performing the
act, just as a contractor in erecting a house does not delegate authority
by employing helpers. Both clerk and contractor remain personally re-
sponsible. With such assistants, it would seem that the task imposed upon
the clerk under the statute was clearly possible, as contended by the
minority.
It should be noted that the minority makes some good procedural points
in denying that any objection to the act was available to plaintiffs. It has
the support of the cases. 9 R. C. L. 1091; 20 C. J. 181; Parvin W. Wim-
berg et al., 130 Ind. 561, 130 N. E. 790.
It seems at least questionable whether the court is sound in the points
it makes as to the non-amendability of an unconstitutional law; and the
contention that impossibility of performance for Indianapolis rendered this
law void for lack of uniform operation under Article IV, Section 23, of
the Constitution of Indiana. J. V. H.
PARENT AND CHILD-WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION CLAIMED BY DELIN-
QUENT CHmI--By their guardian Amos and Ernest Freestone, both under
16 years of age at the beginning of this action, seek to recover workmen's
compensation for the death of their father, Alonzo, which occurred in the
